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IN PREPARATION: TECHNOCRIME 2
expected publication date: summer 2011
Following Technocrime
Technocrime 2 expands on many of the notions and concepts presented in
the first book:
Technocrime does not exist. It is a figment of our imaginations. It is
simply a convenient way to refer to a set of concepts, practices, frames,
and knowledges shaping the ways in which we understand matters having to
do with the impact of technology on crime, criminals and our reactions
to crime — and vice-versa: since crime, criminals and reactions also
transform technology. Technocrime includes crimes against computers, crimes
committed with computers, cybercrimes, crimes involving credit cards, automated
telling machines, communications apparatuses (such as satellite signal
theft) or the violation of protection strategies (including alarm systems
and CD/DVD copy protection schemes). Technocrime gives rise to technosecurity
and technopolice, as sets of various activities explicitly designed to
prevent or repress it (for a complete inventory, see Byrne and Rebovich,
2007). These responses are openly justified by descriptions of “new” technocrimes,
with more lurid or horrifying behaviours calling for stricter laws, restrictions
of due process rules and higher enforcement budgets. But it should not
be assumed that technopolicing follows technocrimes. It may also simply
be the logical extension of security and policing into the high-tech world.
Though private forms of technosecurity are clearly at the vanguard of high-tech
crime protection, the state remains the leader in more exotic, generalized forms
of applied, high-tech security (national security, military security) — though
it relies on private industries for most of the tech provision, of course.
(from the introduction to Technocrime)
In the afterword,
Technology has always been a central element in warfare. The army with
the best equipped soldiers, all other things being equal, had an edge over
enemies less technologically advanced. This applies to weapon and defence
systems of course, but also to support equipment, to information systems
and to the logistics line needed to move, to distribute and maintain the
battle technologies.
The war on crime, no longer a metaphor — like
the war on poverty or the war on cancer — also shares this preoccupation
with the enemy’s capabilities
and with the question of whether “ours” will provide the clear, lasting
superiority we seek. Sometimes this preoccupation comes from a rather straightforward
contrast between the technologies used by criminals and the technologies available
to police. For instance, it is easy to compare the firepower of criminal gangs
and that of police, or the abilities of internet paedophiles with that of the
cybercops who chase them. However, one must bear in mind that, while police adoption
of technology is a quite deliberate, organized, often debated, delayed, mediatized,
etc. process, those who engage in criminal, forbidden or otherwise irritating
behaviour with the help of technology are in a much more spontaneous, opportunistic
and “natural” dynamic. Today’s credit card skimmer is not yesterday’s
mugger. Criminals do not adopt new technologies, they do not modify their trade.
New criminals are seduced by opportunities offered by the new technologies that
suffuse their world... just like technopolice advocates and practitioners.
Other times the contrast in technology mobilisation is more indirect: when a
recent RCMP experiment to use spectrographic analysis of satellite images to
detect marijuana plants, one technology — the peppering of small clutches
of marijuana plants in the middle of large cornfields — won over the other — the
insufficient 4m resolution of the imaging satellite available to police (CCRP,
2002).
Finally, in many instances police technology is contrasted not to technologies
or tactics employed by criminals but to a type of crime or sometimes to “crime” in
general. The involved technologies are guaranteed to impact significant aspects
of criminality and to improve the general security of citizens. Video cameras
are among such technologies. Their connection with their objective is a pure
abstraction, based on symbols (that which is hidden must be revealed), theories
(surveillance deters) or faith (technology works; it will work here as well). |
Confirmed contributors
James Byrne
Wade Wallace Deisman
Benoît Dupont
Benoît Gagnon
Laura Huey and Johnny Nhan
Frédéric Lemieux
Rachel Finn and Mike McCahill
David Murakami Wood
Olivier Ribaux
James Scheptycki
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