Conclusion

According to Martin Rein (1976: 250-1), "values organize facts, and facts are compatible with different values". Furthermore, "we do not usually trust advisers who do not share our values, because their understanding is irrelevant to us" (p. 262). In this case, we have argued that thinking in terms of facts and values becomes irrelevant: the relationship between the two is dictated by language, and language can be changed. Experts offer knowledge that generally fails to produce unequivocal or indisputable moral conclusions. Politicians are not the rational decision-makers that they try to appear to be. Bureaucrats are not only experts at administration, but also at integrating knowledge to action because of its practically infinite legitimating potential. The main interest of scientific knowledge is not to be found at this level: there, it just gets co-opted by politics and becomes ideology.

The claims of objectivity of science cannot be rejected as a blanket statement of the simplistic form: "all science is subjective." Useful comparisons need to offer non-empty contrasts, in other words they need to provide their user with some kind of conceptual discrimination. What is important to consider, however, is that scientific investigations are interesting not so much because they put us in touch with factual reality, but because they offer neutral analyses of our reality. Objectivity, in that sense, is simply intellectual honesty. Scientific knowledge may not be value-free, but it should diversify the process of change while allowing for the public evaluation of scientific conclusions.

The expert as discourse bearer has much to do. However, what she does in itself does not set her apart from other discourse bearers, whether they are opposed to her, agree, set themselves out as experts, politicians, bureaucrats or ordinary people. As we see it, the current extremely narrow focus of economics thinking needs to be questioned by everyone, and to the point that criminologists need to question themselves first, and find out the extent to which they have been colonized by the truths of economics, how much these are relevant to our way of seeing reality. It is not a matter of fighting economists on their turf; we have seen that accepting language is basically surrendering: economics language already answers its own questions in its own way. Criminologists shouldn't have to start arguing that their proposals are financially more profitable/economical. To prove that they are, we would need to adopt economics standards and methods, and in the end, this would beg the question: why study criminology when you can go directly to management school (incidentally, that is Wilson's conclusion)?